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This paper develops a model of supplier-induced demand as strategic framing where 
the patient has reference-dependent references, and the physician can persuade the 
patient to buy a treatment by affecting the patient’s reference point. In the main 
result, the patient is assumed to have a constant rate of risk aversion (lovingness) 
in  the  gain  (loss)  region.  Two  scenarios  are  treated.  In  the  cure  scenario,  the 
physician wants to frame the patient’s decision problem such that he prefers to buy 
a risky curative treatment rather than no treatment. It is shown that the physician is 
most persuasive if she sets a high reference point, such that the patient sees all 
payoffs as losses down from that reference point. In the prevention scenario, the 
physician wants to frame the patient’s decision problem such that he prefers a safe 
preventive treatment rather than no treatment. In this case, the physician’s optimal 
framing either involves framing all payoffs as gains, thus making the patient risk-
averse. Alternatively, loss aversion is exploited by framing only the fact of getting ill 
(rather than having prevented illness) as a loss. 
 
Keywords: supplier-induced demand, prospect theory, strategic framing. 
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Over the last three decades, one of the most popular themes in health economics is the 
supplier-induced  demand  hypothesis,  stating  that  physicians  whose  income  gets  under 
pressure (e.g. because of the entry of new physicians) are able to create demand for their own 
services (Evans, 1974; for a recent overview, see e.g. Peacock and Richardson, 2007). From a 
theoretical point of view, the theory of demand inducement is nothing but a modified version 
of the Dorfman and Steiner (1954) model of advertising. By taking some persuasive effort A, 
the individual physician is able to shift the demand for her services.  The reason that the 
physician does not always induce demand to the full extent lies in a labour-leisure trade-off 
(Newhouse, 1970), or in ethical preferences that become less strong as income gets more 
under  pressure  (De  Jaegher  and  Jegers,  2000).  The  theory  deviates  from  the  neoclassical 
model, in that the patient’s preferences are not assumed to be fixed. Yet, a weakness of this 
theory is that it does not model how persuasion actually takes place. 
Perhaps  partly  to  fill  the  theoretical  gap,  and  certainly  in  response  to  theoretical 
developments  in  microeconomics,  some  health  economic  models  take  a  rather  different 
approach to supplier-induced demand (Dranove, 1988; Calcott, 1999; De Jaegher and Jegers, 
2001).  In  these  models,  the  patient’s  preferences  are  stable,  but  there  is  asymmetric 
information  between  the  physician  and  the  patient.  The  physician  has  incentives  to 
overprescribe  treatment.  The  patient  has  rational  expectations,  and  knows  how  often  the 
physician overprescribes. Supplier-induced demand may still exist simply because the patient 
is  better  off  when  putting  up  with  overprescription.  The  advantage  of  these  theories  of 
supplier-induced demand is that they are more sophisticated than the original, advertising-
like, models, and that they are therefore able to produce more testable predictions. Yet at the 
same time, they are somewhat remote of the original concept of supplier-induced demand as a 
form of persuasion. 
The current paper shows that developments in behavioural economics can contribute to 
construct a simple model of persuasive demand inducement, where the form that persuasion 
may take is modelled in more detail, and predictions are made about what form persuasion 
may  take  in  different  medical  contexts  (for  recent  explorations of  possible  application  of 
behavioural economics in health economics, see Frank (2004), and Barigozzi and Levaggi 
(2008)). Our starting point is the following experiment by Tversky and Kahneman (1981), 
which  happens  already  to  be  stated  in  a  medical  context.  In  the  two  versions  of  this 
experiment, subjects were confronted with the following scenario: 
 
“Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is 
expected  to  kill  600  people.  Two  alternative  programs  to  combat  the  disease  have  been 
proposed.” 
 
In version 1 of the experiment, subjects were offered the choice between Programs A and B, 
which are described as follows: 
 
“If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 
probability that 600 people will be saved and 2/3 probability that no people will be saved.” 
 
In version 2 of the experiment, subjects were offered the choice between Programs C and D:    2 
 
“If  Program  C  is  adopted,  400  people  will  die.  If  Program  D  is  adopted,  there  is  1/3 
probability that nobody will die and 2/3 probability that 600 people will die.” 
 
When the choice is between A and B, 72% of the subjects choose A; when the choice is 
between C and D, 78% choose D. This is in spite of the fact that, from the perspective of 
expected  utility  maximization,  the two  examples are  perfectly  equivalent.  Apparently,  the 
experimenter, by framing the example in a different manner, can influence the reference point 
of the subject, and can cause a preference reversal. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) use these and other experiments to show that 1) people do 
not think in absolute terms (as suggested by expected utility theory), but rather think in terms 
of gains and losses with respect to a reference point. The position of this reference point 
matters for people’s decision. Presumably, in version 1 of the above experiment, the reference 
point is “every one dies”, and everything that deviates from that is a gain. In version 2, the 
reference point is “nobody dies”, and everyone who dies is seen as a loss. 2) Making the 
concept of losses and gains relevant, people think differently about gains and losses. In the 
experiment, it seems that people are risk averse when they think in gains, preferring the safe 
programme  where  200  people  are  saved,  and  are  risk  loving  when  they  think  in  losses, 
preferring the risky programme where there is a probability of 1/3 that nobody dies. The latter 
effect seems to be obtained because subjects hate the thought that 400 people would die with 
certainty, and that in programme D, it is at least possible that all get saved. 3) People care 
more about losses than about gains. Thus, people feel stronger about losing €100 than they do 
about gaining €100. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) summarise these different observation in prospect theory. In 
a steady stream of papers, standard economic models have recently been extended to include 
reference-dependent preferences. A weakness of these models is that it is not often modelled 
how an agent’s reference point is actually determined. Yet, the above experiment shows one 
way in which a reference point may be determined, namely through framing. Indeed, in the 
above experiment, the experimenter is able to affect the subject’s decision by framing the 
formulation of the experiment in such a way that the subject’s reference point is modified. 
Our starting point is that the physician may in a similar manner be able to affect the patient’s 
reference point, and affect the patient’s decision in favour of treatment. We refer to such a 
phenomenon as strategic framing. Strategic framing has attracted interest in, among others, 
political science (e.g. Levy, 2003) and health policy (e.g. Gerend and Cullen, 2008). Yet, 
while prospect theory has become one of the most influential theories in economics, strategic 
framing has received little attention there. Exceptions are Just and Wu (2005), who study the 
effect of strategic framing of compensations in the principal-agent relationship, and Puppe 
and Rosenkranz (forthcoming), who study the effect that the retail prices that manufacturers 
suggest  in  advertisements  have  on  the  price  sensitivity  of  loss  averse  consumers,  and 
indirectly on the prices that retailers are able to set.  
We assume that the patient has reference-dependent preferences, and that the physician can 
set the patient’s reference point. We study such strategic framing in two different contexts. 
First, framing in favour of a risky curative treatment, where the alternative of not having any 
treatment  yields  a  safe  but  relatively  low  outcome.  Second,  framing  in  favour  of  a  safe 
preventive treatment, where the risky alternative is not following any treatment, which may 
yield both a better outcome if the patient remains healthy (as no cost of treatment has then be 
incurred), or a worse outcome if the patient gets ill. 
Section  2  sets  out  the  basic  aspects  of  prospect  theory  that  we  consider  in  our  model. 
Section 3 sets out our model of curative treatment, and of preventive treatment. Section 4   3 
considers strategic framing for our two scenarios under several aspects of prospect theory, 
where these aspects are treated in isolation. The paper ends with a discussion in Section 5. 
 
 
2. Patient reference-dependent preferences 
 
We assume that the patient’s psychic valuation f(X) function of any outcome X obtained in 
Section 3, takes the following form, proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992): 
 
) ( ) ( : R X v X f R X − = ≥  
) ( ) ( : X R v X f R X − − = < λ  
with  0 ) 0 ( , 0 ' ' , 0 ' = ≤ > v v v  and  1 ≥ λ .  (1) 
 
R is the patient’s reference point, with respect to which he thinks in gains ( R X ≥ ) or in 
losses ( R X < ). The fact that the function v is used both to measure gains and to measure 
losses takes into account the reflection effect: if the patient is risk averse with respect to gains, 
then the patient is risk loving with respect to losses ( 0 ' ' < v ). For  1 > λ , the patient is loss 
averse, and losses have a larger impact on him than equally sized gains. An example of f with 
0 ' ' < v  and  1 > λ  is given in Figure 1. As can be seen, –v(R – X) is the mirror of v(X – R). Loss 
aversion shifts the psychic valuation function for losses down from the curve –v(R – X) to the 






In prospect theory, the psychic valuation function is thus concave for gains, and convex for 
losses. The degree of concavity in the gain region determines the degree of risk aversion for 
the  losses,  and  the  degree  of  convexity  in  the  loss  region  determines  the  degree  of  risk 
lovingness.  Concretely,  for  gains  we  can  apply  the  well-known  Arrow-Pratt  measure, 
where ) ( ' / ) ( ' ' X f X f ARA =  is the patient’s absolute rate of risk aversion. For losses, we 
additionally define as  ) ( ' / ) ( ' ' X f X f ARL =  the patient’s absolute rate of risk lovingness. 
Unaccounted for by prospect theory, but relevant for strategic framing, is how ARA and ARL 
depend  on  X,  i.e.  how  the  rate  of  risk-aversion  or  of  risk-lovingness  changes  with  the 
outcome. Yet, because the reflection effect, there will be symmetry in the manner in which 
ARA and ARL change with X. This leads us to distinguish between the following cases for the 
psychic valuation function. With a CARA-CARL psychic valuation function, the patient ARA 
and ARL does not depend on the level of X. With a DARA-IARL psychic valuation function, 
X – R   R – X  
f(X) 
–λv(R – X) 
–v(R – X) 
v(X – R)   4 
the patient becomes less risk averse for high X, and less risk loving for low X. With a IARA-
DARL psychic valuation function, the patient becomes more risk averse for high X, and more 
risk loving for low X. 
 
 




A  patient  can  decide  to  stay  without  a  preventive  treatment,  in  which  case  the  patient 
assesses that he will obtain payoff H (healthy) with probability pG, and payoff S (sick) with 
probability  pB,  where  1 = + B G p p .
1  The  preventive  treatment  yields  payoff  T H −   with 
certainty,  namely  the  healthy  payoff  H  minus  the  cost  T  of  treatment.  We  assume  that 
S T H H > − > , so that it is better to incur the cost of treatment than to be ill. The patient has 
some psychic valuation function f(.) over these outcomes, and prefers to buy the preventive 
treatment if 
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A patient can decide not to buy any curative treatment, in which case the patient obtains 
payoff M with certainty. He assesses that the curative treatment will cure him with probability 
pG, in which case he obtains payoff  T H − , where H reflects the healthy outcome and T the 
cost of treatment, and will with probability pB obtain outcome S – T, where S reflects that the 
a  low  payoff  from  failed  treatment,  and  T  again  the  cost  of  treatment  ( 1 = + B G p p ).We 
assume  that  T S M T H − > > − ,  so  that  it  is  better  to  incur  the  cost  of  treatment  when 
treatment is successful, but worse to incur the cost of treatment when treatment fails. The 
patient has again some psychic valuation function f(.) over these outcomes, and prefers to buy 
the curative treatment if 
 
  ) ( ) ( ) ( T S p T H f p M f B G − + − <  
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where superscript C refers to the cure scenario. 
 
 
                                                 
1 This is secondary prevention, or medical prevention, in contrast to primary prevention, where the latter are  
actions by the patient that reduce the probability of disease (Kenkel, 2000).   5 
4. Physician strategic framing 
 
We  now  bring  in  the  physician,  who  is  assumed  to  be  able  to  influence  the  patient’s 
treatment/no-treatment decision in both scenarios of Section 3 by framing the decision that the 
patient faces, in suggesting a reference point with respect to which the patient then thinks in 
gains and losses. In particular, we assume that the physician always prefers that the patient 
buys the treatment. To emphasise that we treat a model of persuasion, we do not model any 
information asymmetry between physician and patient. In as far as information asymmetry is 
present,  this  has  already  been  eliminated  at  the  start  of  our  game,  an  the  physician  has 
revealed  all  information.  The  patient  now  faces  the  decision  on  whether  or  not  to  buy 
treatment, but is influenced by how the physician frames this decision. 
We assume that the physician knows the expression on the right-hand side of equations (2) 
and (3), but does not know  G B p p / , namely the odds in favour of the bad outcome assessed 
by the patient. For this reason, and because the physician always prefers the patient to buy 
treatment, the physician wants 
P α  in (2) to be as small as possible, and wants 
C α  in (3) to be 
as large as possible. In our model of strategic framing, we thus look for the R that minimises 
P α , and that maximises 
C α . In order to find these R, we need to know what form the function  
) (R
P α  and  ) (R
C α  take. 
A separate analysis for the prevention and cure scenarios is not needed, as  ) (R
P α  and 
) (R
C α  have the same structure. We note that in each of the scenarios, there are only three 
possible outcomes, namely a low outcome 
i
l X , a medium outcome 
i
m X , and a high outcome 
i
h X , where  C P i , =  refers to the scenario, and where  T S X
C
l − = ,  M X
C
m = ,  ) ( T H X
C
h − = , 
and  S X
P
l = ,  ) ( T H X
P
m − = ,  H X
P
h = . We can then express 
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X f X f
−
−
= α  for  C P i , = .  (4) 
 
Because of the asymmetry in the way in which the patient thinks about gains and about 
losses,  rather  than  formulating  one  function  ) (R
i α ,  we  in  fact  need  to  describe  several 
functions relevant for different levels of R. In particular, depending on the relation between R 
and the three outcomes,  ) (R
i α  can take four relevant forms, expressed using the valuation 
function v: 
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In order to know the shape of  ) (R
i α , we need to know the derivative of  ) (R
i α  for each of 
the expressions (4)-(8). Rather than doing this for the specification of equation (1) where there   6 
is at the same time a reflection effect and loss aversion, we separately analyze a specification 
of (1) where there is a reflection effect but no loss aversion (Section 4.1), and a specification 
of (1) where there is loss aversion but no reflection effect (Section 4.2). In this way, we can 
see the isolated impact of both the reflection effect, and of loss aversion. This is important as 
the impacts of these two effects can work in opposite directions. Additionally, inside both the 
loss and the gain region,  ) (R
i α  may depend on the level of R. As we show below, the sign of  
R R
i ∂ ∂ / ) ( α  depends on whether v is DARA or IARA for the gain region, and on whether v is 
DARL or IARL for the loss region. Whether we have a DARA-IARL or a IARA-DARL psychic 
valuation function, may again affect whether it is optimal for the physician to frame the 
payoffs as losses or as gains, so whether f is DARA-IARL or IARA-DARL is a yet a third effect 
that may affect the optimal R, on top of the reflection effect and of loss aversion. This is why 
in Section 4.1, where loss aversion is assumed away, we consider the CARL-CARA case, and 
we  thus  also  assume  the  effect  of  the  DARA-IARL  and  IARA-DARL  cases  away.  In  this 
manner, Section 4.1 purely studies the impact of the reflection effect, as it does not matter to 
what extent the physician frames the payoffs as gains or losses, but only whether she frames 
the payoffs as gains. Section 4.2 assumes the reflection effect away, so that the patient is 
everywhere risk neutral, and focuses purely on loss aversion. This is automatically also a 
CARL-CARA case, as the rate of risk aversion and the rate of risk lovingness are both zero. 
Section 4.3 purely considers the effect of having either the DARA or IARA cases for the gain 
region, and the IARL or DARL cases for the loss region. The focus here thus is on the extent to 
which the physician should frame the payoffs as gains (losses) once the decision to frame 
purely as gains (losses) has been made.  
 
4.1 λ = 1, CARA-CARL 
 
As is well-known, the CARA utility function takes the form  ) exp( ) ( aX X u − − = , where the 
ARA is the constant a. In terms of the psychic valuation function, we can construct in a similar 
way a CARA-CARL psychic valuation function, which has a constant ARA = a in the gain 
region, and a constant ARL = a in the loss region (a > 0): 
 
[ ] ) ( exp 1 ) ( : R X a X f R X − − − = ≥  
[ ] { } ) ( exp 1 ) ( : X R a X f R X − − − − = <   (9) 
 
where the constant 1 is added to assure that for R = X, f(X) = 0. Also, in order to exclude loss 
aversion, we have λ = 1. We now obtain the following proposition for this case: 
 
 
Proposition 1. Let the patient’s psychic valuation function take the CARA-CARL form, and 
let λ = 1. Then 
(i)  In the prevention scenario, the physician frames all the patient’s payoffs as gains ( S R ≤ ). 
As long as all payoffs are framed as gains, it does not matter how low R is set. 
(ii) In the cure scenario, the physician frames all the patient’s payoffs as losses ( ) ( T H R − ≥ ). 
As long as all payoffs are framed as losses, it does not matter how high R is set. 
Proof:   7 
Step 1. By definition,  ( ) [ ] { } [ ] { }
[ ] { } [ ] { } ) ( exp 1 ) ( exp 1
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α  and is not a function of R. The same 
can be checked for  ( )
i
h
i X R ≥ α . 
Step 2. Given that the patient is risk averse for gains and risk loving for losses, and given Step 
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Step  3.  By  definition,  ( ) [ ] { } [ ] { }
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= ≤ < α . 
Multiplying  both  numerator  and  denominator  by  ) exp(aR ,  this  can  be  rewritten  as 
( ) [ ]
) exp( ) exp( ) exp( ) exp( 2
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X R X
− − − − −
− − −
= ≤ < α .  The  derivative  of  this 
expression with respect to R is larger than zero for  R X
i
l < . In the same manner, it be checked 





i α  for 
i
h X R < . 
QED. 
 
The result in Proposition 1 is clear. CARA-CARL means that the proportion between any 
two marginal valuations (which is the form taken by 
i α ) is constant as long as all payoffs are 








h X X X X − = − .  Then 
for 
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h X f X f X f X f − = − , meaning that  1 =
i α  (Figure 
2b). For 
i








h X f X f X f X f − < − , so that  1 <
i α  (Figure 2a). For 
i
l X R ≥ , 








h X f X f X f X f − > − , so that  1 >
i α  (Figure 2c). This is illustrated in Figure 2. 
As a function of R,  ) (R
i α takes the form given in Figure 3. 
Intuitively, in the prevention scenario, all payoffs are framed as gains in order to make the 
patient risk averse and prefer a safe, preventive treatment. In the cure scenario, all payoffs are 
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4.2 λ > 1,  0 ' ' = v  
 
We now consider the case where there is loss  aversion (λ > 1), but where there is no 
reflection effect, in that the patient is both risk neutral for gains and for losses ( 0 ' ' = v ). This 
may be seen as a CARA-CARL case with zero risk aversion and risk lovingness. Any strategic 
framing is then done with the purpose of taking advantage of the patient’s loss aversion. In 
this case, the psychic valuation function is simply linear: 
 
) ( ) ( : R X a X f R X − = ≥  
) ( ) ( : X R a X f R X − − = < λ   (10) 
 
where  0 > a ,  1 > λ . This case leads us to Proposition 2. 
 
 
Proposition 2. Let the patient’s psychic valuation function have  0 ' ' = v , and let λ >  1. Then 
(i)  In the prevention scenario, the physician puts R exactly at  T H − . 
X – R   R – X  
f(X) 
–v(R – X) 
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(c) 
i α  
R  i
l X  
i
h X  9 
(ii) In the cure scenario, the physician either puts  ) ( T H R − ≥ , or  ) ( T S R − ≤ , where the 
level of R does not matter as long as it leaves these inequalities valid. 
Proof: 
Step  1.  By  definition,  ( )
) ( ) (
) ( ) (
R X a R X a
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α  . In both these expressions all R’s cancel out, and 












, as follows simply from the linear form of the psychic valuation 
function. 
Step  2.  By  definition,  ( )
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,  so  that 





i α . It follows that the minimal 
i α  is reached for R such that 
i
m X R = . 
QED.  
 
Clearly, framing everything as a loss is equivalent to framing everything as a gain because 
of  the  linear  form  of  the  psychic  valuation  form. 
i α   can  be  seen  as  a  relation  between 
differential utilities, and for a linear utility function, the relation between any two differential 
utilities is by definition the same. The reason that 
i α  is minimised for 
i
m X R =  can be seen 
from  Figure  4.  Consider  the  horizontal  distance  between  arrows,  to  which  corresponds  a 
differential utility. When there is no loss aversion, this differential utility is the same whatever 
the reference point, in this case 2d. However, when as in this case  2 = λ , the part of the 
differential utility seen as a loss decreases the utility more, so that the differential utility 
becomes 3d. Looking at (4), it is clear that the physician can use this principle to increase 




m X f X f − . Specific about the linear psychic valuation function is that this can be done 








m X f X f −  at its lowest when 
i
m X R = . As a function of R,  ) (R
i α takes the form given in Figure 5. 
 









4.3 Physician only able to frame either everything as a gain, or everything as a loss 
 
We now look separately at the case where the physician frames everything as gains (losses). 
When does changing R have any effect in this case? Let us consider the DARA-IARL case. 
Intuitively, for gain framing, if the patient becomes more risk averse closer to the reference 
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i α  decreases. For loss framing, if the patient 
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The two terms in this expression are nothing but the differential versions of two Arrow-Pratt 
measures. Analogous calculations apply for the case where everything is framed as losses. 
QED 
 
The effect of changing the reference point when all payoffs are framed as gains or as losses 
is clear. Yet, when some payoffs are framed as gains and others as losses, then the effect of 
changing the reference point is ambiguous. This is because one of the differential valuations 





While we have analyzed loss aversion and the reflection effect for a valuation function with 
a constant rate risk aversion/risk lovingness, it is straightforward to derive results for a model 
where  there  is  both  loss  aversion  and  a  reflection  effect.  The  simplest  case  is  the  cure 
scenario. Here, both loss aversion and the reflection effect prescribe that all payoffs should be 
framed as losses. From the perspective of the reflection effect, the patient should be made risk 
loving to make him willing to buy the risky curative treatment. Framing the best outcome as a 
gain will not make the patient more willing to buy this treatment, since the higher differential 
valuations caused by loss aversion then no longer apply. In the prevention scenario, the results 
are ambiguous. From the perspective of the reflection effect, all payoffs should be framed as 
gains,  in  order  to  make  the  patient  risk  averse  and  buy  the  safe  preventive  treatment. 
However, from the perspective of loss aversion, the lowest payoff should be framed as a loss, 
in order to make the patient fear incurring a low health status that could have been prevented. 
With a combined reflection effect and loss aversion effect, optimal framing therefore depends 
on the relative strength of these two effects. 
The following questions are the subject of future research. First, we need to investigate 
optimal framing when the rate of risk aversion/risk lovingness of the patient is not constant. 
Second, further insights should be obtained if a broader range of scenarios for the choices   12 
facing the patient are treated. Third, an aspect of prospect theory not treated in this paper is 
the overweighting of small probabilities (Kahneman and Tversky, 1992). Once a wider range 
of scenarios are treated, it can be investigated whether a physician could frame in order to 
take  advantage  of  this  effect  as  well.  A  fourth  question  deserving  attention  is  at  a  more 
fundamental level. We have assumed that there is no limit on the extent to which a physician 
can frame. Yet, loss framing makes the patient unhappy, while gain framing makes the patient 
happy.  If  the  patient  avoids  physicians  who  make  him  feel  unhappy,  then  the  ability  of 
physicians to frame as losses will be reduced. This would suggest that persuading a patient to 
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